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Abstract: We develop a theoretical account of how athletes engaged in risky sports value risk-
reducing information and use stated-preference data from a sample of backcountry skiers to 
empirically challenge the predictions of our model. Risk taking in this specific context depends 
on the athlete’s personal attitudes toward risky activities and his strategies to control the risk. 
Usage of specific information is one strategy of risk control. We estimate the demand value for 
avalanche information. Caution is however warranted because unobserved factors may jointly 
affect the athlete’s perception of risk and his willingness-to-pay for obtaining the information. 
We use a recursive two stage estimation approach to account for endogeneity concerns. Our 
results indicate that the demand value of information increases with wealth and perceived risk 
and tends to decrease with better skills to control risk and more information about the prevailing 
field conditions. These results support our theoretical predictions and suggest that variation in 
athletes’ WTP can be explained by their beliefs about the usefulness of information. 
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“I’m not a daredevil, I’m the kind of person who really gears up for a project and I partner with the right 
people to learn the things that I don’t know. Each jump is very well-prepared and it is only when I feel that I 
did my homework that I jump.”  
— BASE jumper Felix Baumgartner in a 2007 interview with the Austrian radio station Ö1. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A puzzling paradox of modern society is that, while we generally agree on the intrinsic 
value of reducing threats to individual well-being, some of us engage in activities involving a 
high risk of injury or death (Lyng 2005). Death rates for some risky sports are particularly 
startling. One out of 77 members of expeditions to the Mount Everest does not return once they 
climbed higher than the base camp (Firth et al. 2008). Annually, one out of 1,400 members of the 
U.S. parachute association dies in a skydiving accident (USPA 2011). Among backcountry skiers 
in Switzerland, the group of athletes we are going to study in the empirical part of this paper, the 
annual death rate amounts to one in 10,000 skiers (Waeger and Zweifel 2008). 
While economists are deeply interested in risk-taking behavior (Schoemaker 1993), the 
bearing of physical risks outside the market context has not received much attention 
(Loewenstein 1999). In the psychological literature, the concept of sensation seeking has been 
developed to describe personality traits that drive some people into risking life and limb in 
exchange for a thrilling experience (Slanger and Rudestam 1997, Zuckerman 2007). Sociologists 
have argued that voluntary engagement in high risk sports might be the outcome of acquired 
preferences for the intense feelings entailed by testing one’s skills in the face of danger (Lyng 
2005). Both explanations have appeal to economists as they suggest that risky behavior can be 
captured by incorporating preferences over intense feelings into the athlete’s utility function. 
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There is another remarkable observation on people engaged in risky sports. The majority 
of them practice their sport in a very controlled and safety concerned manner (Brymer 2005). 
When it comes to extreme sports such as rope-free climbing, BASE jumping, or steep skiing, 
athletes carefully prepare attempts and look out for all the relevant information to keep the 
objectively high risk at a controllable level. This precautionary behavior suggests that athletes do 
not derive utility from risk taking per se, but rather from what Jeremy Bentham referred to as the 
pleasures of skill (Loewenstein 1999). 
Given that athletes are not reckless risk seekers they should value information that helps 
them to keep risk at an acceptable level (Hirshleifer and Riley 1992). In the next section, we 
develop a stylized model of engaging in risky sports and derive propositions on the value of risk-
reducing information to athletes who deliberately take physical risks. More specifically, we 
extend the state-dependent utility model commonly used in the literature on mortality risk 
valuation (Jones-Lee 1974, Pratt and Zeckhauser 1996, Viscusi 1993, Weinstein et al. 1980) to 
reflect that athletes can and do actively reduce risk through the use of relevant information. 
The main theoretical findings of our model are in line with standard theory. Athletes are 
willing to pay more for information that helps them to reduce risk, the more risk they face and the 
wealthier they are. Conversely, they are willing to pay less for the same information, the more 
skilled or better informed they are. We empirically challenge these findings using stated-
preference data from a sample of backcountry skiers whom we inquired about their willingness-
to-pay (WTP) for an improved avalanche forecasting service. In section 3, we give a detailed 
account of the empirical setting, the sample, and the survey. Section 4 presents our econometric 
strategy and reports on results that support our theoretical predictions. Section 5 concludes with a 
discussion of the major findings and how they relate to the mortality risk literature. 
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2. Theoretical Background 
We often hear people saying that an accident could have been avoided if only one had 
known that… So what is the value of risk-reducing information? In the common case where 
information about the future is uncertain, the agent encounters a problem of valuing imperfect 
information (Hirshleifer and Riley 1992). He is offered a prediction or forecast that reduces the 
uncertainty in future decisions. The amount that the agent is willing to pay for receiving this 
information depends on whether, and by how much, he believes that it will help him in making a 
utility-maximizing decision.  
Information can have a crucial impact on the level of risk taken by athletes and new 
means of information exchange have made some sports drastically safer. (Think of high altitude 
mountaineers who call in the latest weather forecast via satellite phone before a peak ascent.) 
However, how safe a particular endeavor ultimately is does not only depend on information, but 
also on personal attitudes toward risk and the available technologies to reduce risk (Shogren and 
Crocker 1991). To model this, we assume that each athlete holds a safety production function that 
allows him to control risk by means of information I and self-protection skills S. Knowing about 
his safety capacity, the athlete chooses the frequency and severity of the sports activity R, which 
we shall call the risky good. The safety production function s determines the athlete’s subjective 
probability to meet with an accident: 
(1) ),,,(1 SRIθp   
where  : R+  [0,1) is a twice differentiable function so that better skills and more information 
reduce risk at a diminishing marginal rate (Liu 2004): 
(2) .0/,0/,0/,0/ 2222  SpSpIpIp  
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Risking more or more often has a negative effect on safety, but this effect is smaller the 
better informed or more skilled the athlete is: 
(3) .0/,0/,0/ 22  SRpIRpRp  
The rationale of this assumption is that an athlete with more skills or better information at his 
command can pursue a more dangerous line, enter steeper terrain, or plunge into bigger waves 
without increasing the risk to the same extent as a less skilled or worse informed athlete. 
 The safety production function implies that the athlete is able to dose the amount of risk 
he is willing to take in exchange for the expected benefits of his attempt (Alhakami and Slovic 
1994). To inform this trade-off, he evaluates the subjective expected utility of each option by: 
(4) ),(),,(),()],,(1[ RGvSRIpRGuSRIpSEU  , 
where u(G, R) denotes utility in the good state and v(G, R) denotes utility in the bad state, i.e. in 
case of a severe accident. The arguments of the state-dependent utility functions include the 
utility-entailing risky good R and a composite risk-free good G that reflects the athlete’s outside 
consumption opportunities. (Below, we suppress the arguments to avoid notational clutter.) 
We maintain some assumptions common in the health risk literature. We posit that the 
good state is always preferred to the bad state (u > v). Marginal utility is strictly larger in the 
good state (∂u/∂G > ∂v/∂G). (Viscusi and Evans (1990) and Finkelstein et al. (2013) provide 
empirical support for this assumption). In the good state, marginal utility from consuming G and 
R is strictly positive (∂u/∂G > 0, ∂u/∂R > 0) and diminishing (∂2u/∂G2 < 0, ∂u2/∂R2 < 0); in the 
bad state, marginal utility is non-negative (∂v/∂G ≥ 0, ∂v/∂R ≥ 0) and diminishing (∂2v/∂G2 < 0, 
∂v2/∂R2 < 0). Further, we assume that the utility from G and R is additively separable (∂2u/∂G∂R 
= ∂2v/∂G∂R = 0) so that the pleasure an athlete receives from a specific sports activity does not 
depend on wealth. 
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In the “first-best” world, athletes maximize Eq. (4) with respect to the budget constraint Y 
= G + PI I + PS S to determine the preferred amount of risk to be taken. (Here, Y denotes 
disposable income, G is the numéraire, and PI and PS are per unit prices of information and skill 
acquirement.) Let L be the Lagrangian of this maximization problem. Then, the first order 
condition with respect to increments in the risky good R is: 
(5) RuRvR
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Hence, maximizing subjective expected utility requires the athlete to behave in such a way that 
the marginal loss in safety entailed by the activity, weighted by the difference in utility received 
in the two states of the world, equals the expected marginal utility gained from the risky 
endeavor. We interpret this as the tradeoff referred to by the popular saying ‘no risk, no fun’.  
This finding does not tell much about the demand value of risk-reducing information. 
From the first order condition, ∂L/∂I = ∂p/∂I (v – u) – PI = 0, we can only infer that demand 
depends on the per unit price of information. However, safety-relevant information such as the 
weather conditions on a specific peak is usually not a market good. To still deduce the value of 
risk-reducing information we turn to the athlete’s WTP for receiving more information given his 
current state of knowledge I0. WTP in this context is readily measured by the Hicksian 
compensating variation C that the athlete is willing to give up in exchange for information: 
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 Eq. (6) extends the standard model of mortality risk valuation in that it allows the athlete 
to endogenously adjust WTP depending on his personal ability to reduce risk through the 
provided information. WTP is larger (smaller) than in the standard model if 1/  Ip
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)1/(  Ip .1 Apart from the idiosyncratic use of information to reduce risk our model works 
along the lines of the standard model. That is, increased exposure results in a decrease of the 
denominator of Eq. (6) and, thus, in an increment of WTP for risk-reducing information (Pratt 
and Zeckhauser 1996). In Appendix A, we discuss the link to the value of information literature.  
 Based on the endogenous WTP formulation in Eq. (6), we derive the following 
propositions on the athletes’ demand for risk-reducing information. 
PROPOSITION 1. Athletes who face larger risks have a higher WTP for risk-reducing 
information than athletes who face smaller risks. 
 PROOF. The partial derivative of WTP with respect to risk is: 
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assumption that ∂u/∂G > ∂v/∂G. ■ 
LEMMA 1. Athletes who are more frequently exposed have a higher WTP for risk-
reducing information than less frequently exposed athletes.  
PROOF. The partial derivative of WTP with respect to the risky good is: 
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which follows from Eqs. (2-3) and the assumption that ∂u/∂G > ∂v/∂G. ■ 
PROPOSITION 2. Wealthier athletes have a higher WTP for risk-reducing information than less 
wealthy athletes. 
 
                                                 
1 This feature of our model is similar to other models in the health risk literature (Liu 2004, Shogren and Stamland 
2002, Viscusi 1990). 
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PROOF. The partial derivative of WTP with respect to the non-risky good is: 
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which follows from Eqs. (2-3) and the assumption that ∂u/∂G > ∂v/∂G. ■ 
PROPOSITION 3. Athletes who are better informed about prevailing conditions have a lower 
WTP for extra-information than less well informed athletes. 
PROOF. The partial derivative of WTP with respect to information I is: 
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from Eqs. (2-3).  ■ 
PROPOSITION 4. High-skilled athletes have a lower WTP for risk-reducing information than 
low-skilled athletes. 
PROOF. See Appendix B. 
In the following we are going to scrutinize these propositions based on a dataset of Swiss 
backcountry skiers. Backcountry skiing has become a popular sport in Europe (Holler 2007) and 
North America (Stethem et al. 2003) despite its proneness to avalanche risk. The annual death toll 
among backcountry skiers in Switzerland is about 20, implying a statistical mortality risk of 10–4 
per year (Waeger and Zweifel 2008). About 90% of the victims either trigger or are buried in an 
avalanche released by another group member (McClung and Schaerer 2006). Moreover, skiers 
may control their risk through the use of information provided by avalanche forecasts (Tremper 
2001). The high degree of self-control makes backcountry skier a soliciting population to study 
the value of risk-reducing information. 
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3. Empirical Study 
Avalanche forecasts convey information about the conditions in the backcountry and rate 
risk based on an internationally standardized danger scale from ONE to FIVE, where ONE means 
generally safe conditions and FIVE means very high avalanche risk (McClung and Schaerer 
2006). In Switzerland, the national avalanche forecasting service issues a daily forecast during 
the winter. This forecast follows a default script providing (i) general information on the weather, 
snow conditions and snowpack during the past 24 hours, (ii) the latest weather developments 
relevant to avalanche danger, (iii) the avalanche danger forecast for various regions indicating the 
danger level for the following day, and (iv) a danger outlook for the next two days.2 
To date, avalanche information is provided as a quasi-public good and, because skiers 
have free access, one cannot deduce a market price for risk-reducing information. For this reason 
revealed-preference methods are not feasible. Instead we draw on stated-preference data to elicit 
skiers’ value of risk-reducing avalanche information. We do so cautiously since we are well 
aware of the potential problems that may arise from the hypothetical nature of stated preferences 
(List and Gallet 2001, Loomis 2011).  
Of course, it would be daunting to ask people about their WTP for a good to which they 
have already free access. Thus, we let respondents evaluate a hypothetical, but realistic, 
enhancement of the current avalanche forecasting service that would provide more detailed local 
information over a longer forecast range. And we reminded respondents of the free access they 
have to the current forecasting service. 
Some remarks on avalanche information are in order. We stress that avalanche forecasts 
are often misperceived. A recent study found that while two-thirds of the surveyed skiers knew 
                                                 
2 The Swiss avalanche forecasting system is accessible under: www.slf.ch.  
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the prevailing avalanche danger scale, only one-third could recall specific information on danger 
spots (Schwiersch et al. 2005). Moreover, professional guides and recreationists differ 
considerably in their use of avalanche information to inform site choices (Haegeli et al. 2010). 
Other studies confirm the differences between experts and novices in terms of knowledge, 
training, rescue skills, and behavior in dangerous situations.  
However, better skills do not always result in lower risk. McCammon (2004) identified 
six heuristic fallacies that let even experienced skiers misjudge avalanche risks. Skiers take more 
risk in familiar terrain; they risk more once they have judged the terrain as safe; they risk more 
when they can earn respect from peers; they risk more in the presence of others; they take 
disproportionate risks to access virgin snow; and they ascribe risk-controlling skills to group 
leaders which these leaders might or might not have. 
These field level findings are in perfect agreement with the value of information theory—
it is not the information that is of worth, it is what you do with the information (Hirshleifer and 
Riley 1992). Economic wisdom holds that the value provided by the enhanced forecasts is readily 
measured by the maximum amount a skier would be willing to pay for accessing the extra 
information (Hilton 1981). The demand value is private to the skier in that it depends on his 
perceived accuracy of the information and on his ability to make use of it in reducing risk. Hence, 
it is important to understand how skiers perceive avalanche risk and how better information 
impacts their decision behavior in the terrain (Tremper 2001). Arguably, a survey approach is the 
only way to learn more about these things. 
3.1 Survey 
We administered an online survey to a convenience sample of skiers whom we recruited 
from among the visitors of the web site that distributes the daily avalanche forecast for 
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Switzerland. Participation was voluntary, unpaid, and anonymous. The survey was offered in any 
of four languages (German, French, English or Italian) and comprised four broad sections.  
Section A inquired about the respondent’s skills and experience in backcountry skiing and 
whether the respondent is a (semi-)professional mountain guide. Section B included a series of 
questions about the respondents’ usual efforts to reduce avalanche risk. We also inquired about 
the attendance of avalanche safety classes, the use of safety equipment, and the frequency of 
rescue search practicing. In section C, respondents rated the existing avalanche forecasting 
service. We asked them to judge its information value on an ordinal scale from low to high. This 
led to the question whether the respondent had ever been caught in an avalanche. The section 
closed with some further questions on avalanche prevention strategies. 
At the heart of the survey we elicited WTP for an improved version of the current 
avalanche forecast. In the prelude, all respondents were told about the hypothetical enhancement 
of the current avalanche forecasting service that would provide more detailed information. 
Respondents were then randomly assigned to a treatment or control variant of the survey. The 
control group did not receive information about the expected benefits of the enhanced forecast 
and directly moved on to the WTP question. By contrast, the treatment group was explicitly told 
that on average twenty skiers die each year in avalanche accidents and that the enhanced forecast 
could reduce this death toll to either sixteen or fourteen fatalities per year (see Appendix C). 
Respondents were queried about their WTP for the enhanced forecasting service using a 
double-bounded dichotomous choice (DBDC) format (Carson and Hanemann 2005). 
Specifically, they were asked whether they would be willing to pay a randomly assigned bid 
amount from Table 1 for a one-year subscription to the enhanced forecasting service. If 
respondents stated that they would be willing to pay the initial bid bI, we questioned them again 
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at a higher amount bH. If they refused, we asked whether they would be willing to pay a lower 
amount bL. Respondents who declined both bids were asked to report a maximum WTP value bP. 
<INSERT TABLE 1> 
Directly after the WTP question we asked respondents to compare their personal risk with 
the statistical risk of dying in an avalanche and to state whether they believe it was lower, the 
same as, or higher than that of the average backcountry skier. In section D, we asked additional 
questions about their risk tolerance and elicited socio-demographic information. 
3.2 Sample 
The survey was online from February through April 2009. During this period a total of 
1,210 persons took the survey. We deleted records with invalid IP addresses or complete item 
non-response and excluded respondents who we identified through their email addresses to work 
for the research institute that issues the avalanche forecasts. This left us with a sample of n = 
1,134 valid responses. Below, we highlight the most remarkable features of the sample. A full 
description of the sample characteristics is given in Table 2. 
<INSERT TABLE 2> 
Males account for 87% of the sample. On average respondents received 16 years of 
formal schooling. Almost 70% of the respondents live in Switzerland. They earn a monthly mean 
net household income of roughly CHF 7,700, which is somewhat above the 2009 population 
average of CHF 6,700 (BFS 2011). Slightly less than half of the respondents actually lead groups. 
Two-thirds of the respondents report to be moderately experienced backcountry skiers; about 
28% believe they are advanced backcountry skiers and the remaining 6% are beginners. Half of 
the respondents judge their personal risk of dying in an avalanche to be about the same as that of 
the average backcountry skier; 42% (8%) of them think it is lower (higher). 
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Since the survey was posted online, we have no means to assure that our sample is 
representative of the universe of backcountry skiers. Comparison to a large population survey on 
sports (Lamprecht et al. 2008) suggest that with respect to age and the number of backcountry 
trips our sample is very similar to the average Swiss backcountry skier. The only exception is the 
share of males who are overrepresented in our sample (87% vs. 60%). 
Respondents were recruited while retrieving the avalanche forecast and, thus, the sample 
might over-represent skiers who care relatively more about safety. If that was the case, one would 
expect the sample’s WTP for the enhanced forecast to be higher than that of the general 
population of backcountry skiers. We cannot rule out such a self-selection bias, but since our 
sample closely resembles that of a user survey on the Swiss avalanche forecasting service, which 
did not mentioned fees, we can at least rule out that self-selection occurred as result of the 
announced pay service. In any case, our sample seems too specific to permit extrapolations to 
other information services. 
4. Econometric Model 
Answers to our WTP question provide a mix of point and interval data. Some 205 
respondents (18%) stated that they were not willing to pay anything at all for access to the 
enhanced forecasting service. Another 212 respondents (19%) stated an exact and positive 
amount. Answers of 717 respondents (63%) implied intervals of WTP. An appropriate 
econometric strategy to analyze such a sample is the spike model by Kristrom (1997), which 
specifies the latent WTP C* as a mixture distribution of the following form: 
(7) 
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where π  [0,1] is the probability to observe a zero WTP and H(C) is a continuous and increasing 
function in C such that )(lim 0→ CHC  and .1)(lim →∞ CHC  
To estimate the spike model researchers commonly specify a parametric distribution of 
the latent WTP, which they evaluate using maximum likelihood methods (Carson and Hanemann 
2005). This approach works fine as long as respondents take the announced risk reduction at face 
value. However, if unobserved factors affect the perceived risk and the WTP at the same time, 
then WTP estimates will be distorted (Konishi and Adachi 2011, Whitehead 2005).  
This is exactly the situation our theoretical model predicts. Skiers decide about the 
frequency and seriousness of their backcountry trips and use skills and information to control 
their personal risk pi as defined by Eq. (1). It seems natural that their WTP for better avalanche 
information is influenced by how much risk they believe to face. Hence, we want to estimate the 
WTP distribution conditional on a set of covariates that capture the skiers’ perceived risk and 
their ability to control risk. 
We do so by setting up a recursive mixed-process model (Roodman 2011). The model 
treats the WTP elicitation as the outcome of the joint decision over two latent variables, the 
response to the WTP question for which we have interval or point data and the ordinal risk 
estimates. Formally, let *iC  denote respondent i’s latent WTP and *ip  his unobserved subjective 
risk. Now, define two limited dependent variables Ci and pi so that: 
(8a) 
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(8b) 
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with p  denoting the avalanche mortality risk to the average backcountry skier.3  
Let i1X  and i2X  be 1  K1 and 1  K2 row vectors of exogenous variables. Then, a pair of 
simultaneous equations can be set up for the continuous latent random variables *iC  and *ip : 
(9a) ,* * 11111 iiiii εγpβpC  αX  
(9b) ,* * 22222 iiiii εγCβCp  αX  
with '.,0][;,...,1,][;2,1,][,0][ '211221
2 iiεεEniσεεEjσεEεE iiiijjiji   The chronology 
of the survey approach allows us to restrict some of the parameters of Eq. (9b) to zero (Konishi 
and Adachi 2011). It is safe to assume that β2 = γ2 = 0 because neither respondent i’s true WTP to 
obtain risk-reducing information in the future nor his answer to the corresponding WTP question 
can logically affect the perceived risk *ip  of past and/or current activities. In consequence, the 
system of equations is recursive. 
Both coefficients γ1 and β1 in Eq. (9a) capture potentially relevant effects. The former 
measures the extent to which latent factors that affect the skier’s risk estimate also influence his 
WTP for risk-reducing information; the latter measures the extent to which the skier’s WTP is 
affected by the stated risk itself. As Heckman (1978) shows, both effects can jointly enter the 
model because substitution for *ip  results in a recursive system of simultaneous equations: 
 
                                                 
3 In the empirical analysis, we present results for both an ordered probit specification and a simple probit 
specification where we include . iff1low p*pp ii   
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(10a) , * 11211 iiiii ξβpC  θXαX  
(10b) ,* 222 iii ξp  αX  
where θ = α2 γ1, ξ1i = ε1i + ε2i γ1, and ξ2i = ε2i.  
 Assuming that ξ1i and ξ2i are bivariate normally distributed as BVN(0, 0, 1, 1, ), the 
mixed-process model is fully identified and provides means to test the hypothesized effect of 
endogenous risk on the demand value for risk-reducing information. If the errors of the WTP and 
risk equation are uncorrelated, i.e.  = 0, the model boils down to the conventional spike model 
(Kristrom 1997). If on the other hand  ≠ 0, it yields the conditional mean E[C*|X1, X2, Π] and 
median M[C*|X1, X2, Π] WTP. 
 One drawback of the model as shown in Eq. (10) is that its identification rests on the joint 
normality assumption and might be fragile in the absence of exclusion restrictions. A natural 
strategy for better identification is to exclude a vector of controls which affect WTP only through 
their effect on risk perceptions (Wilde 2000). We therefore partition },{2 iii zxX such that ix  is a 1 
 Kx row vector of exogenous variables included in the WTP equation and iz  is a 1  Kz row 
vector of excluded exogenous variables that support identification. 
5. Results 
We begin the presentation of the results with a check of the internal validity of WTP 
responses. We do so by examining whether the percentage of <YES> responses declines 
monotonically with the initial bid amount (Alberini 2005). Table 3 shows that this is indeed the 
case, confirming that the demand for the extra information decreases with increasing prices. The 
frequency of pairs of responses to the initial and follow-up bids indicates that the sample is 
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generally well behaved. YY sequences accounted for 19.4% of the sample, NY for 14.7%, YN 
for 29.2%, and NN for 36.7%. 
<INSERT TABLE 3> 
Proportions of <YES> responses across initial bids are equal in the control and treatment 
groups and we do not find evidence for a relationship between the initial bid amount and the 
tendency to report zero WTP.4 In the Appendix (Table D1) we present results of a probit 
regression, indicating that respondents were more likely to declare zero WTP for the improved 
forecasting system when they did not use the current forecasting system, thought it was of little 
information value, or believed that their risk was below average. This is encouraging as it 
suggests that respondents carefully considered the good to be valued. 
5.1 Regression Results 
We now turn to the regression analysis. Table 4 presents three different specifications of 
the simultaneous equations model fitted with Stata’s cmp routine (Roodman 2011). All of them 
assume that latent WTP is lognormally distributed.5 Model I is the conventional spike model, 
imposing that factors which determine the respondents’ WTP are uncorrelated with unobserved 
factors that may affect their perceived risk. Models II (first stage probit) and III (first stage 
ordered probit) relax this assumption by allowing for correlation between perceived risk and 
WTP. That is, we treat  as an estimable parameter and can therefore test whether respondents 
who rated their risk to be higher/lower than average had a higher/lower WTP than those who 
rated their risk to be average. 
<INSERT TABLE 4> 
                                                 
4 The percentages of zero WTP responses in the groups of respondents who received initial bids of CHF 15, 40, 50, 
100 and 200 were 20%, 23%, 18%, 20% and 19%. 
5 A closeness test (Vuong 1989) on the spike model suggests that the lognormal distribution fits our empirical data 
significantly better than other distributional forms. 
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We augmented the vectors i1X  and i2X  with individual information to capture differences 
in WTP and perceived risk that arise from the characteristics of the respondent. The WTP 
equation contained characteristics of the skier as well as dummies indicating whether he had 
received the control or treatment variant of the survey.  
Besides the skier’s characteristics, the risk equation contained further regressors that 
indicate safety relevant behavior. We posit that these regressors affect the WTP for risk-reducing 
information only through the respondent’s perceived risk. E.g., skiers who make many trips to the 
backcountry are more exposed to avalanche risk than skiers who do only few trips (TRIPS). If 
they also perceive their risk to be higher, then we expect them to be willing to pay more for the 
enhanced forecasting system than less exposed skiers. A similar reasoning applies to the other 
excluded exogenous regressors (SCORE, YOE, SAFEC, PRACT_HIGH, PRACT_LOW, 
STEQUIP, ADDEQ, DEFENS, CAUGHT).6 All of them do not increase WTP for information 
per se, but may affect it through their effect on skier’s risk perception. 
Model I deliberately assumes independence between perceived risk and WTP for risk-
reducing information. The results suggest that only three variables are significant predictors of 
WTP. In favor of Proposition 2, WTP increases by ~5% for every additional CHF 1,000 in 
monthly household income (HHINC). Swiss residents (SWISS) are willing to pay almost 50% 
more for the improved forecasting service. In support of Proposition 4, respondents who stated 
that the current forecasts provide useful information always or most of the times (VOI_LARGE) 
have a 26% higher WTP than those who stated that these forecasts provide useful information 
only some of the times. Other covariates including the skill and risk variables are insignificant. 
                                                 
6 The SCORE variable measures the skier’s risk propensity based on answers to six behavioral questions, which 
inquired about the respondent’s preferences for descents, difficult terrain, physical challenge, powder snow, and road 
safety on hazardous mountain roads. All other excluded exogenous variables are described in Table 2. 
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Perceived avalanche risk increases with the frequency (TRIPS) and seriousness of past 
trips (SCORE). Residents (SWISS) assessed their risk of dying in an avalanche to be smaller than 
did non residents; as did skiers who behaved defensively under uncertain snow conditions 
(DEFENS), believed to be healthier than their age mates (HEALTH), and had practiced rescue 
operations three or more times in the last winter (PRACT_HIGH). 
The WTP equation of Model II confirms these results with one notable exception. Skiers 
who rated their risk to be below average (RISK_LOW) have a three times smaller value for the 
improved forecasting system than skiers who rated their risk to be average or above average. The 
correlation coefficient is large ( = –0.56) and significant, indicating that perceived risk affects 
the WTP for risk-reducing information. 
In model III two additional regressors become (weakly) significant. In support of 
Proposition 3, highly skilled skiers (SKILLS_HIGH) are willing to pay 15% less for the risk-
reducing information; those who rated their risk to be higher than that of the average skier 
(RISK_HIGH) are willing to pay one and a half times more for risk-reducing information. The 
correlation coefficient of model III remains large ( = –0.48) and significant confirming that 
indicators of self-assessed avalanche risk should not be seen as exogenous regressors to explain 
WTP for risk-reducing information. 
5.2 Scope and Robustness Tests 
The WTP equation incorporated dummies indicating whether or not the respondent 
received information about the expected effectiveness of the improved forecasting service 
(TREAT); and, if informed, whether the annual risk reduction was four (RR_BASE = 1) or six 
(RR_LARGE = 1) avoided fatalities among 200,000 skiers. Although the signs of the respective 
coefficients are plausible, we found that neither the disclosure of information nor the size of the 
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risk reduction had a significant impact on WTP. Two factors may explain the statistical 
insignificance of the treatments. 
First, respondents were not told that the improved forecasting system would decrease their 
personal risk. Instead, the risk reduction was expressed in terms of avoided fatalities per year. 
Clearly, this metric is related to the average skier. Yet, the results in Table 4 suggest that more 
than 50% of the respondents considered their personal risk to be higher or lower than average. It 
seems that these respondents used their own risk to inform their payment decision rather than the 
provided information about the risk reduction expected to the average skier. Second, respondents 
evaluated small reductions in risk (4:200,000 vs. 6:200,000) and it is well possible that they 
perceived these risk reductions as approximately equal in size (Corso et al. 2001). 
To examine external validity, we compared our WTP estimates to value of statistical life 
(VSL) estimates obtained in a similar context. In Table 5, we provide summary statistics of the 
VSL implied by the answers of those respondents who received information about the average 
risk reduction and stated that their personal risk was equal to that of the average skier.7 We 
contrast these estimates with benchmark VSL values by Leiter and Pruckner (2009), who recently 
studied avalanche mortality risk in Austria. Our WTP estimates imply somewhat higher VSL 
values, but still in the same order of magnitude. 
<INSERT TABLE 5> 
As a further robustness check we repeated the regression analysis on restricted samples. 
We excluded zero WTP responses (Table D2), non-residents (Table D3), and skiers who did less 
than five backcountry trips last winter (Table D4). Due to the limited number of observations, the 
                                                 
7 We lack a risk denominator to calculate the VSL value for respondents who stated a lower or higher risk than that 
of the average skier or those who received the control treatment. 
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SKILL_HIGH and RISK_HIGH variables are no longer statistically significant in these restricted 
samples, but the general thrust of the results remains unchanged. 
6. Discussion 
Some people risk their life to ski a virgin slope, to climb a remote peak, or to basejump 
from a skyscraper. Such activities seem reckless and the public often meets them with a shake of 
the head. Indeed, deliberate risk taking is not reconcilable with the standard economics model of 
health risk valuation, in which some sort of compensation is required for accepting any risk 
increment. We have extended the standard health risk model (Viscusi 1993) to reflect that 
athletes receive utility from a risky leisure activity. Our model assumes that athletes use 
idiosyncratic skills to control risk, which helps explaining why it is not irrational that athletes, 
who voluntarily take large risks, strive at the same time to minimize these risks. 
Based on the model, we have derived four propositions on the demand value of risk-
reducing information. These propositions have strong ties to the existing literature. As in the 
standard VSL model, wealthier athletes should be willing to pay more for an information that 
provides means for risk reduction (Hammitt and Treich 2007). However, the actual risk reduction 
depends crucially on the athlete’s ability to make use of the received information. Because our 
model presumes that both skills and information help to reduce risk, athletes should be willing to 
pay less for information the better skilled they are and the more they know about the prevailing 
conditions (Shogren and Stamland 2002). And as in the standard model, athletes should be 
willing to pay more for risk-reducing information when they face larger risks (Pratt and 
Zeckhauser 1996). 
We have scrutinized these propositions using a stated preference survey of backcountry 
skiers, a group of athletes who bear a considerable risk of dying. We find strong empirical 
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support for the propositions 1-3. Indeed, WTP for risk-reducing information increased with 
household income and was substantially smaller (larger) among skiers who rated their personal 
risk to be lower (higher) than average. The more valuable a skier judged the information provided 
by the current avalanche forecasts, the more he was willing to pay for the improved forecasting 
system. Empirical support for Proposition 4 (skill level) is somewhat weaker, but high skilled 
skiers at least tended to have a lower WTP for the improved forecasting system than average or 
low skilled skiers. 
Athletes have the means to make use of skills, equipment, and information, in ways that 
allow them to take risks others would not survive. Mastering these risks is what gives them 
pleasure. Therefore, high-risk athletes value information to control risk and—importantly—they 
base the value of this information on their perceived risk rather than on the population average 
risk. This highlights the importance of accounting for endogenous beliefs over risk. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Initial and follow-up bid amounts (in CHF). 
Initial bid (bI) Follow-up bid if <YES> (bH) Follow-up bid if <NO> (bL) 
15 40 7 
40 50 15 
50 100 40 
100 200 50 
200 300 100 
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Table 2. Descriptive sample statistics (N = 1,134). 
Variables Description Mean SD Min. Max.
ADEQUIP Use of advanced safety and rescue equipment 0.31 0.46 0 1
AGE Age of the respondent in years 40.61 12.02 14 76
CAUGHT Respondent had been caught in avalanche 0.19 0.40 0 1
CLEAR_BASE a Current forecast is often clear 0.40 0.49 0 1
CLEAR_HIGH Current forecast is always/mostly clear 0.53 0.50 0 1
CLEAR_LOW Current forecast is only some of the time clear 0.07 0.25 0 1
DEFENS Defensive behavior under uncertain snow conditions 0.27 0.44 0 1
EDUC Educational attainment in years 16.00 2.58 4 21
FAMILY Respondent has family 0.71 0.45 0 1
HEALTH Health better than that of age-mates 0.68 0.47 0 1
HHINC Monthly household income in 1,000 CHF 7.70 3.24 2.5 13
MALE Respondent is male 0.87 0.33 0 1
LEAD Respondent leads groups of skiers 0.49 0.50 0 1
PRACT_BASE a Practiced 1-2 times with beacon in pre-season 0.64 0.48 0 1
PRACT_HIGH Practiced ≥ 3 times with beacon in pre-season 0.21 0.41 0 1
PRACT_LOW Did not practice with beacon in pre-season 0.14 0.35 0 1
RISK_BASE a Personal risk equal to that of average skier 0.49 0.50 0 1
RISK_HIGH Personal risk higher than that of average skier 0.08 0.27 0 1
RISK_LOW Personal risk lower than that of average skier 0.42 0.49 0 1
SAFEC Respondent attended safety class 0.32 0.47 0 1
SCORE b Risk propensity score 1.69 1.38 0 6
SKILLS_BASE a Respondent is an intermediate in backcountry skiing 0.66 0.47 0 1
SKILLS_HIGH Respondent is a proficient in backcountry skiing 0.28 0.45 0 1
SKILLS_LOW Respondent is a beginner in backcountry skiing 0.06 0.23 0 1
STEQUIP Use of standard safety and rescue equipment 0.92 0.26 0 1
SWISS Respondent is a Swiss resident 0.69 0.46 0 1
TREAT Information about risk reduction is disclosed 0.50 0.50 0 1
RR_BASE a Proposed risk reduction is 4 in 200’0000  0.23 0.42 0 1
RR_HIGH Proposed risk reduction is 6 in 200’0000  0.27 0.44 0 1
TRIPS Backcountry trips during the past winter season 15.57 8.17 0 25
USE Forecasts always/mostly consulted before trip 0.98 0.15 0 1
VOI_BASE a Forecast gives valuable information: often 0.40 0.49 0 1
VOI_HIGH Forecast gives valuable information: always/mostly 0.52 0.50 0 1
VOI_LOW Forecast gives valuable information: some of the times 0.08 0.27 0 1
YOE Years of experience 14.63 8.36 0 25
a Baseline reference levels not included in the regression analysis; b the SCORE variable measures the skier’s risk 
propensity based on answers to six behavioral questions, which inquired about the respondent’s preferences for 
descents, difficult terrain, physical challenge, powder snow, and road safety on hazardous mountain roads. 
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Table 3. Frequency and percentage share of <YES> responses to the initial bid (N = 1,134). 
Initial bid (in CHF) Number of respondents (N) <YES> responses 
15 254 182 (72%) 
40 234 133 (57%) 
50 222 116 (52%) 
100 219 76 (35%) 
200 205 43 (21%) 
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Table 4. Regression results.  
 MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III 
 Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Risk equation         
CUT1 0.611  0.513 -0.222  0.569 0.601  0.503 
CUT2 2.359 *** 0.518   2.343 ** 0.502 
ADEQUIP 0.028  0.080 0.034  0.082 0.044  0.074 
AGE 0.015  0.021 0.020  0.023 0.018  0.021 
AGE^2 -0.038 * 0.023 -0.045 * 0.026 -0.041 * 0.024 
CAUGHT 0.121  0.096 0.097  0.102 0.148  0.094 
DEFENS -0.132  0.085 -0.047  0.094 -0.047  0.094 
EDUC 0.019  0.014 0.004  0.015 0.020  0.015 
FAMILY -0.110  0.090 -0.151  0.100 -0.132  0.087 
HEALTH -0.165 ** 0.078 -0.236 *** 0.087 -0.168 ** 0.076 
LEAD -0.026  0.079 -0.047  0.086 -0.054  0.079 
MALE 0.138  0.111 0.118  0.121 0.158  0.109 
PRACT_HIGH -0.213 ** 0.096 -0.083  0.103 -0.127  0.100 
PRACT_LOW 0.082  0.121 0.036  0.131 -0.031  0.125 
SAFEC 0.106  0.091 0.158 * 0.092 0.133  0.087 
SCORE 0.076 *** 0.028 0.018  0.029 0.057 * 0.030 
SKILL_HIGH 0.105  0.090 0.022  0.100 0.091  0.090 
SKILL_LOW -0.088  0.172 -0.170  0.185 -0.119  0.178 
STEQUIP 0.167  0.167 0.222  0.172 0.109  0.171 
SWISS -0.343 *** 0.078 -0.371 *** 0.087 -0.338 *** 0.077 
TRIPS 0.030 *** 0.005 0.032 *** 0.006 0.031 *** 0.005 
USE 0.088  0.264 -0.053  0.277 0.076  0.225 
YOE 0.000  0.006 -0.001  0.006 -0.002  0.005 
WTP equation         
CONSTANT 2.828 *** 0.537 3.244 *** 0.583 3.170 *** 0.577 
SCALE 1.039  0.028 1.144 ** 0.067 1.136 * 0.079 
AGE 0.029  0.021 0.020  0.023 0.026  0.023 
AGE^2 -0.034  0.023 -0.016  0.027 -0.023  0.027 
CLEAR_HIGH -0.046  0.079 -0.043  0.077 -0.044  0.077 
CLEAR_LOW 0.183  0.158 0.205  0.173 0.212  0.174 
EDUC -0.014  0.015 -0.013  0.016 -0.021  0.016 
FAMILY -0.003  0.093 0.071  0.101 0.064  0.101 
HEALTH 0.051  0.080 0.113  0.082 0.090  0.081 
HHINC 0.048 *** 0.013 0.046 *** 0.012 0.046 *** 0.013 
LEAD 0.084  0.076 0.053  0.083 0.065  0.083 
MALE -0.054  0.109 -0.100  0.109 -0.138  0.109 
RISK_HIGH 0.077  0.147   0.809 ** 0.315 
RISK_LOW -0.108  0.079 -1.113 *** 0.278 -0.876 *** 0.296 
RR_LARGE 0.093  0.105 0.093  0.109 0.090  0.108 
SKILL_HIGH -0.057  0.088 -0.119  0.096 -0.168 * 0.102 
SKILL_LOW -0.087  0.155 0.087  0.162 0.073  0.163 
SWISS 0.281 *** 0.084 0.390 *** 0.095 0.390 *** 0.098 
TREAT -0.025  0.093 -0.028  0.095 -0.023  0.095 
USE 0.203  0.295 0.147  0.324 0.097  0.312 
VOI_HIGH 0.228 *** 0.078 0.226 *** 0.076 0.236 *** 0.076 
VOI_LOW -0.223  0.162 -0.193  0.182 -0.216  0.187 
Model Characteristics   
RHO 0.000  fixed -0.556 *** 0.127 -0.484 *** 0.147 
Log-likelihood RISK eq. -957.07        
Log-likelihood WTP eq. -1400.65        
Log-likelihood -2357.71   -2107.03   -2353.98   
Observations 1134   1134   1134   
*** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, and * P < 0.1. 
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Table 5. Comparison of mean and median VSL values (in million CHF) against the benchmark VSL 
values by Leiter and Pruckner (2009: Table 6), inflation adjusted and converted to 2009 CHF. 
 Mean VSL (95%-CI) a Median VSL (95%-CI) a 
Benchmark VSL values by Leiter and Pruckner 
based on a risk reduction of 1:42,500 
3.17 (2.49-3.85) 1.43 (1.11-1.75) 
VSL values implied by Model II a 
assuming a risk reduction of 1:40,000 
5.42 (1.76-9.08) 2.82 (0.92-4.72) 
VSL values implied by Model III a 
assuming a risk reduction of 1:40,000 
4.59 (1.40-7.79) 
 
2.41 (0.73-4.09) 
 
a VSL values based on the answers of respondents who received either of the two treatment variants of the survey 
and rated their risk to be equal to the average skier. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Theoretic link to the Value of Information literature  
Our theoretical model treats the self-control of risk as a black box. However, economic theory 
provides a clear idea of how athletes should make use of information to reduce their risk 
(Hirshleifer and Riley 1992). We seek to make this link more apparent. Consider the example of 
a backcountry skier who does not have free access to the avalanche forecast and asks himself 
whether the forecast would be worth paying for. Before every trip, the skier has some 
assumptions about the prevailing conditions. We denote his prior subjective assessment of the 
probability of an avalanche accident by p0.  
Let i = 1, 2, …, n be a set of signals conveyed by the avalanche forecast. The skier is 
assumed to update his initial assessment of avalanche risk, i.e. his beliefs about p0, in a Bayesian 
way (Hirshleifer and Riley 1992). Ex ante, he does not know which signal he will receive. Hence 
he determines a subjective probability πi of receiving the specific signal i, which is conditional on 
receiving signal i given that it is an accurate description of the prevailing conditions (πi|Θ) and on 
not receiving signal i when it does not accurately describe the prevailing conditions (1 – πi|Θ): 
(A1) )1)(1( 0Θ|0Θ| pπpππ iii  , 
where Θ denotes prevailing conditions or “states of the world”. After receiving the signal, the 
skier may determine the posterior probability of an accident pΘ|i by updating his prior risk 
assessment, taking the presumed diagnostic accuracy of the forecasting system into account: 
(A2) iii πpπp /0Θ||Θ  . 
Based on pΘ|i the skier may decide to revise the planned route, to avoid a particular slope, 
or to cancel a backcountry trip outright. That is, he decides over the set of actions a = 1, 2,…, x 
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that are relevant to his safety. The demand value of information provided by signal i can readily 
be measured by the compensating variation ct that makes the skier indifferent between receiving 
and not receiving the signal before a specific trip t (Hilton 1981): 
(A3) )].,(),()1[(max)]},(),()1[(max{ 00|Θ|Θ RGvpRGupRcGvpRcGupE aaataitaiai   
where ct is an ex-ante measure of the skier’s WTP for information that makes the backcountry 
trip t safer. 
Next, we demonstrate that summed over all BC trips t = 1, 2, …, T where access to 
information is of value the compensating variation equals the skier’s demand value C for 
seasonal access to the enhanced information system as derived by Eq. (6), i.e. . t t Cc  We 
assume that the skier’s utility derived from risky sports activities R and from the non-risky good 
G is additive with state dependent utility functions u(G, R) = 10 + 5 log(G + R) and v(G, R) = 
log(G + R) borrowed from Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996). Standing in front of a steep slope, the 
skier can choose between two actions: go on (a1) or turn around (a2). Let 1.01|0 ap  be the skier’s 
prior probability of an avalanche accident when entering the slope. By turning back he eliminates 
avalanche risk to zero, i.e. 0
2|0
ap . The right-hand side of Eq. (A3) becomes the following 
maximization problem:
 
(A4) )].log(510:);log(6.49:[max 212,1 GaRGaa   
Now consider the case where the skier accessed the forecast, which provided him with 
either of two signals for steep slopes—safe (i1) or risky (i2). Based on his experience with the 
forecasting system he determines the likelihood uiπ |1  of receiving signal i1 when it is safe to enter 
the slope (Θ = u), and the likelihood viπ |2  of receiving signal i2 when it is dangerous (Θ = v).  
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Since forecasting services tend to minimize false positives (type I errors), which usually 
entail more severe consequences than false negatives (type II errors), we assume that ,|| 12 uivi ππ   
e.g., 5.0|1 uiπ  and 8.0|2 viπ . Based on the assessment of these likelihoods the skier updates the 
initial risk assessment, deriving posterior probabilities of ending up in an accident conditional on 
the received signal i1 or i2 and having continued the trip (a1): 
(A5) 043.0
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The left-hand side of Eq. (A3) then becomes the following maximization problem: 
(A7) )].log(510:);log(3.45.8:|);log(8.46.9:|[max{ 221112,1, tttati cGaRcGiaRcGiaE   
After incorporating the skier’s subjective probabilities of receiving signal i1 or i2—say 
2.0  and  0.8
21
 ii ππ —into Eq. (A7), the decision problem of Eq. (A3) simplifies to: 
(A8) )]log(510);log(6.49[max)]log(510);log(7.44.9[max
2,12,1
GRGcGRcG
atta


 
From Eq. (A8) it follows that ct is the compensating amount that makes the skier 
indifferent between receiving and not receiving information that helps him to choose the best 
feasible action in the course of a particular backcountry trip t.  
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 4 
PROOF. To show that the partial derivative of WTP with respect to the level of skills S is negative, 
we take the first order condition:  
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and solve for: 
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If skills and information are substitutes or independent risk reduction technologies 
(∂2p/∂I∂S ≥ 0), the inequality in Eq. (B2) follows from the common assumption that ∂u/∂G > 
∂v/∂G (Finkelstein et al. 2013, Viscusi and Evans 1990). If skills and information are 
complements (∂2p/∂I∂S < 0), then Eq. (B2) can be re-arranged to yield: 
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Under the complementarity assumption between skills and information, all endogenous risk 
functions in line with Eqs. (2-3) imply that 1
2   ZI pZpIp  and, in turn, ψ > 0. Rearranging yields 
the following sufficient condition for Proposition 1 to hold: .1ψ
ψ
G
v
G
u 



   In words, the marginal 
utility of consumption in the good state relative to the marginal utility in the bad state must be 
larger than the threshold value ψ
ψ1 . For this to be the case, either GvGu   or ψ have to be 
sufficiently large. If we consider that accidents in risky sports often result in death, it seems 
reasonable to assume that Gu µ Gv  and, hence, the condition is fulfilled in all relevant cases. ■ 
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Appendix C. Exact wording of the treatments and WTP questions 
Treatment text. The avalanche forecast is currently provided free of charge to users of the WSL Institute 
for Snow and Avalanche Research SLF in Davos. The forecast for avalanche danger is valid for the next 
24 hours. Suppose it was possible to develop an enhanced forecasting service with more detailed 
information on avalanche danger on a regional and local scale, and forecasts of avalanche danger for the 
next 48 hours. The improved avalanche information would support many backcountry and out of bound 
skiers/snowboarders in their decision-making. Currently, about 20 fatalities occur every winter in 
avalanche-related accidents. It is estimated that the enhanced and extended avalanche bulletin would 
reduce the number of avalanche-related fatalities to 16 [14] per winter. Suppose that to help defray the 
cost of developing and providing these enhanced forecasting services, it was necessary to charge users for 
accessing them on the SLF web site, via phone, MMS, WAP, and Teletext. You would still have access to 
the basic 24 hour forecast for free. Would you be willing to pay bI CHF for a one-year subscription with 
unlimited access to this enhanced avalanche bulletin with more detailed local conditions and forecasts 
extended to 48 hours? 
Control text. The avalanche forecast is currently provided free of charge to users of the WSL Institute for 
Snow and Avalanche Research SLF in Davos. The forecast for avalanche danger is valid for the next 24 
hours. Suppose it was possible to develop an enhanced forecasting service with more detailed information 
on avalanche danger on a regional and local scale, and forecasts of avalanche danger for the next 48 hours. 
Suppose that to help defray the cost of developing and providing these enhanced forecasting services, it 
was necessary to charge users for accessing them on the SLF web site, via phone, MMS, WAP, and 
Teletext. You would still have access to the basic 24 hour forecast for free. Would you be willing to pay bI 
CHF for a one-year subscription with unlimited access to this enhanced avalanche bulletin with more 
detailed local conditions and forecasts extended to 48 hours? 
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Appendix D. Robustness tests 
Table D1. Probit regression of zero WTP. 
Coef. Std. Err. 
(Intercept) -0.868 0.628 
AGE 0.022 0.025 
AGE^2 -0.017 0.028 
EDUC -0.020 0.018 
CLEAR_HIGH 0.077 0.097 
CLEAR_LOW -0.272 0.211 
FAMILY -0.047 0.119 
HEALTH -0.087 0.099 
HHINC 0.000 0.016 
LEAD 0.056 0.094 
MALE 0.226 0.153 
RISK_HIGH 0.259 0.167 
RISK_LOW 0.228 ** 0.096 
SKILL_HIGH 0.277 *** 0.101 
SKILL_LOW -0.349 0.240 
SWISS -0.034 0.101 
TREAT 0.014 0.112 
TREAT_HIGH -0.075 0.127 
USE -0.647 ** 0.300 
VOI_HIGH -0.070 0.097 
VOI_LOW 0.501 *** 0.172 
Model characteristics 
Log- likelihood -511.077
Observations 1,134
McFadden R^2 0.06
*** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, and * P < 0.1. 
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Table D2. Sample restricted to non-zero WTP responses (N = 929). 
 MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III 
 Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Risk equation         
CUT1 0.399  0.584 0.030  0.665 0.409  0.580
CUT2 2.212 *** 0.588   2.212 *** 0.584
ADEQUIP 0.009  0.088 0.037  0.090 0.034  0.080
AGE 0.024  0.023 0.036  0.026 0.028  0.023
AGE^2 -0.047 * 0.026 -0.062 ** 0.030 -0.052 ** 0.026
CAUGHT 0.058  0.108 0.073  0.113 0.105  0.099
DEFENS -0.174 * 0.093 -0.060  0.104 -0.059  0.091
EDUC 0.019  0.016 -0.001  0.017 0.020  0.016
FAMILY -0.133  0.099 -0.205 * 0.108 -0.160  0.098
HEALTH -0.208 ** 0.086 -0.268 *** 0.096 -0.210 ** 0.086
LEAD -0.013  0.086 -0.038  0.094 -0.044  0.085
MALE 0.037  0.119 0.002  0.130 0.055  0.118
PRACT_HIGH -0.217 ** 0.108 -0.098  0.116 -0.101  0.104
PRACT_LOW 0.010  0.134 -0.055  0.141 -0.119  0.125
SAFEC 0.046  0.099 0.127  0.100 0.088  0.090
SCORE 0.081 *** 0.031 0.013  0.032 0.055 * 0.030
SKILL_HIGH 0.077  0.101 -0.037  0.111 0.059  0.099
SKILL_LOW -0.198  0.185 -0.277  0.199 -0.248  0.184
STEQUIP 0.174  0.183 0.227  0.189 0.098  0.168
SWISS -0.340 *** 0.087 -0.395 *** 0.097 -0.332 *** 0.087
TRIPS 0.031 *** 0.006 0.033 *** 0.006 0.031 *** 0.006
USE -0.089  0.331 -0.280  0.376 -0.086  0.332
YOE -0.001  0.006 -0.002  0.007 -0.004  0.006
WTP equation         
CONSTANT 2.828 *** 0.537 3.162 *** 0.597 3.121 *** 0.592
SCALE 1.039  0.028 1.142 ** 0.067 1.149 * 0.085
AGE 0.029  0.021 0.014  0.024 0.023  0.023
AGE^2 -0.034  0.023 -0.009  0.028 -0.018  0.026
CLEAR_HIGH -0.046  0.079 -0.040  0.077 -0.042  0.079
CLEAR_LOW 0.183  0.158 0.207  0.173 0.218  0.158
EDUC -0.014  0.015 -0.011  0.016 -0.021  0.016
FAMILY -0.003  0.093 0.091  0.104 0.081  0.105
HEALTH 0.051  0.080 0.122  0.084 0.109  0.089
HHINC 0.048 *** 0.013 0.046 *** 0.012 0.045 *** 0.013
LEAD 0.084  0.076 0.049  0.085 0.060  0.084
MALE -0.054  0.109 -0.051  0.110 -0.096  0.120
RISK_HIGH 0.077  0.147   0.878 *** 0.292
RISK_LOW -0.108  0.079 -1.114 *** 0.282 -0.937 *** 0.270
RR_LARGE -0.057  0.088 0.092  0.109 -0.156  0.101
SKILL_HIGH -0.087  0.155 -0.095  0.097 0.134  0.184
SKILL_LOW 0.281 *** 0.084 0.132  0.169 0.400 *** 0.098
SWISS -0.025  0.093 0.398 *** 0.098 -0.023  0.092
TREAT 0.093  0.105 -0.028  0.095 0.087  0.104
USE 0.203  0.295 0.220  0.342 0.153  0.324
VOI_HIGH 0.228 *** 0.078 0.223 *** 0.076 0.233 *** 0.078
VOI_LOW -0.223  0.162 -0.194  0.182 -0.215  0.161
Model Characteristics   
RHO 0.000  Fixed -0.556 *** 0.128 -0.512 *** 0.149
Log-likelihood RISK eq. -774.78         
Log-likelihood WTP eq. -1400.65         
Log-likelihood -2175.43   -1971.96   -2171.57   
Observations 929 929 929 
*** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, and * P < 0.1. 
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Table D3. Sample restricted to residents (N = 783). 
 MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III 
 Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Risk equation         
CUT1 1.181  0.636 -0.889  0.690 1.186 * 0.611
CUT2 2.910 *** 0.643    2.898 *** 0.612
ADEQUIP -0.059  0.098 -0.027  0.113 0.009  0.103
AGE 0.018  0.026 0.021  0.288 0.020  0.027
AGE^2 -0.042  0.029 -0.046  0.032 -0.043  0.030
CAUGHT 0.173  0.226 0.262  0.231 0.148  0.224
DEFENS -0.316 *** 0.120 -0.210  0.134 -0.215  0.135
EDUC 0.164  0.147 0.089  0.172 0.028  0.159
FAMILY 0.080  0.118 0.078  0.132 0.146  0.120
HEALTH -0.144  0.107 -0.080  0.132 -0.044  0.128
LEAD 0.019  0.017 0.009  0.019 0.022  0.017
MALE -0.177  0.109 -0.213 * 0.119 -0.197 * 0.108
PRACT_HIGH -0.109  0.096 -0.196 * 0.107 -0.111  0.095
PRACT_LOW 0.064  0.095 0.004  0.102 0.032  0.094
SAFEC 0.199  0.133 0.185  0.144 0.230 * 0.129
SCORE 0.067  0.115 0.167  0.122 0.120  0.116
SKILL_HIGH 0.063 * 0.034 0.010  0.037 0.043  0.038
SKILL_LOW 0.226 ** 0.115 0.158  0.127 0.191 * 0.114
STEQUIP 0.032  0.205 -0.008  0.222 -0.046  0.212
TRIPS 0.033 *** 0.007 0.036 *** 0.007 0.032 *** 0.007
USE 0.204  0.338 0.054  0.349 0.172  0.301
YOE -0.003  0.007 -0.006  0.008 -0.008  0.007
WTP equation   
CONSTANT 3.433 *** 0.655 3.920 *** 0.688 3.959 *** 0.700
SCALE 1.018  0.034 1.092  0.078 1.124  0.117
AGE -0.009  0.025 -0.016  0.027 -0.011  0.027
AGE^2 0.009  0.028 0.023  0.031 0.020  0.032
CLEAR_HIGH 0.002  0.018 0.000  0.018 -0.008  0.020
CLEAR_LOW 0.117  0.112 0.211 * 0.120 0.226 * 0.127
EDUC -0.029  0.093 -0.030  0.093 -0.025  0.093
FAMILY -0.065  0.199 -0.064  0.203 -0.053  0.204
HEALTH 0.015  0.097 0.052  0.093 0.028  0.095
HHINC 0.047 *** 0.015 0.046 *** 0.015 0.046 *** 0.015
LEAD 0.081  0.180    0.835 * 0.469
MALE -0.049  0.127 -0.036  0.131 -0.038  0.132
RISK_HIGH 0.041  0.090 0.004  0.097 -0.005  0.101
RISK_LOW -0.123  0.093 -0.943 * 0.402 -0.919 ** 0.440
RR_LARGE -0.018  0.128 -0.077  0.131 -0.130  0.142
SKILL_HIGH -0.037  0.109 -0.116  0.120 -0.172  0.137
SKILL_LOW -0.065  0.180 0.022  0.190 0.042  0.197
TREAT 0.009  0.112 0.003  0.115 -0.003  0.115
USE 0.308  0.377 0.258  0.358 0.218  0.343
VOI_HIGH 0.264 *** 0.093 0.266  0.092 0.277 *** 0.092
VOI_LOW -0.277  0.209 -0.241  0.235 -0.247  0.244
Model Characteristics    
RHO 0.000  fixed -0.476 * 0.202 -0.506 ** 0.218
Log-likelihood RISK eq. -647.32   
Log-likelihood WTP eq. -954.31         
Log-likelihood -1601.62   -1444.76   -1599.53   
Observations 783   783   783   
*** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, and * P < 0.1. 
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Table D4. Sample restricted to skiers who did at least five trips in the last winter (N = 978). 
 MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III 
 Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Risk equation         
CUT1 0.757  0.642 -0.350  0.750 0.857  0.610 
CUT2 2.518 *** 0.646    2.610 *** 0.609 
ADEQUIP 0.034  0.084 0.036  0.088 0.046  0.079 
AGE 0.022  0.022 0.031  0.025 0.025  0.023 
AGE^2 -0.046 * 0.025 -0.056 ** 0.028 -0.049 * 0.026 
CAUGHT 0.165  0.197 0.237  0.195 0.152  0.181 
DEFENS -0.210 ** 0.099 -0.077  0.110 -0.123  0.113 
EDUC 0.193  0.135 0.181  0.155 0.076  0.148 
FAMILY 0.159  0.099 0.129  0.107 0.182 * 0.097 
HEALTH -0.148  0.092 -0.048  0.116 -0.040  0.122 
LEAD 0.031 ** 0.015 0.015  0.016 0.032 ** 0.015 
MALE -0.091  0.097 -0.112  0.109 -0.112  0.096 
PRACT_HIGH -0.196 ** 0.085 -0.274 *** 0.097 -0.195 ** 0.083 
PRACT_LOW -0.012  0.083 -0.029  0.092 -0.036  0.084 
SAFEC 0.198  0.123 0.202  0.134 0.224 * 0.120 
SCORE 0.097  0.099 0.145  0.102 0.124  0.095 
SKILL_HIGH 0.082 *** 0.030 0.030  0.031 0.068 ** 0.034 
SKILL_LOW 0.137  0.092 0.059  0.102 0.126  0.092 
STEQUIP -0.145  0.247 -0.166  0.273 -0.195  0.227 
SWISS -0.321 *** 0.084 -0.345 *** 0.094 -0.316 *** 0.083 
TRIPS 0.026 *** 0.006 0.028 *** 0.007 0.028 *** 0.006 
USE -0.076  0.376 -0.378  0.463 -0.078  0.317 
YOE -0.001  0.006 -0.005  0.007 -0.005  0.006 
WTP equation      
CONSTANT 3.198 *** 0.688 3.619 *** 0.738 3.539 *** 0.711 
SCALE 1.032  0.031 1.140  0.097 1.136  0.121 
AGE 0.020  0.023 0.007  0.026 0.015  0.026 
AGE^2 -0.028  0.025 -0.005  0.031 -0.013  0.031 
CLEAR_HIGH -0.010  0.016 -0.014  0.017 -0.023  0.019 
CLEAR_LOW 0.096  0.102 0.159  0.111 0.154  0.113 
EDUC -0.029  0.084 -0.033  0.083 -0.033  0.083 
FAMILY -0.035  0.179 -0.058  0.186 -0.037  0.185 
HEALTH 0.062  0.088 0.150  0.096 0.124  0.095 
HHINC 0.051 *** 0.014 0.051 *** 0.013 0.050 *** 0.013 
LEAD 0.055  0.150    0.807 * 0.454 
MALE 0.068  0.112 0.072  0.114 0.070  0.114 
RISK_HIGH 0.061  0.081 0.044  0.090 0.054  0.089 
RISK_LOW -0.056  0.086 -1.090 ** 0.437 -0.850 * 0.461 
RR_LARGE -0.083  0.121 -0.168  0.125 -0.200  0.132 
SKILL_HIGH -0.085  0.091 -0.140  0.100 -0.190 * 0.111 
SKILL_LOW -0.091  0.225 0.034  0.245 0.058  0.245 
SWISS 0.277 *** 0.089 0.375 *** 0.106 0.379 *** 0.112 
TREAT -0.011  0.100 -0.017  0.101 -0.011  0.101 
USE -0.031  0.455 0.086  0.432 0.012  0.399 
VOI_HIGH 0.214 ** 0.083 0.222 *** 0.082 0.231 *** 0.082 
VOI_LOW -0.266  0.179 -0.249  0.200 -0.275  0.208 
Model Characteristics    
RHO 0.000  fixed -0.563 ** 0.195 -0.492 * 0.225 
Log-likelihood RISK eq. -840.21     
Log-likelihood WTP eq. -1192.15     
Log-likelihood -2032.35   -1799.66   -2030.47   
Observations  978    978  978  
*** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, and * P < 0.1. 
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